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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

I.M.L. FREIGHT, INC:
GARRETT FREIGHTLINES, INC
and TRANSCON LINES
Plaintiff-Appellee
Vi

C.N. OTTOSEN, Commissioner
of Insurance of the State of
Utah, STATE TAX COMMISSION
of the State of Utah, and
VERNON ROMNEY, Attorney
General of the State of
Utah

Case No.
13973

Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF ON APPEAL OF
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action to
determine the relationship between the
Utah No Fault Act and the Utah Workmen's
Compensation Act and to determine the
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Commissioner of Insurance.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the
Court without a jury who found that
the No Fault Act has no application
to employees injured while in the
course and scope of their employment
who are covered by Workmen's Compensation; that an employee's exclusive
remedy against his employer for
damages resulting from injuries
sustained in the course of his
employment is limited to benefits
provided by the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act; and that the Utah No
Fault Act cannot be made applicable
to accidents which occur outside the
boundaries of the State of Utah by
regulation of the State Insurance
Commissioner.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks a reversal
of the judgment of the trial court and a
judgment determining (1) that Plaintiffs
failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies before bringing this action in
the court, (2) that Plaintiffs must comply
with the Utah No Fault Act without regard
to the benefits provided employees under
the Workmen's Compensation Act and
(3) that the Commissioner by regulation ca:
make applicable the No Fault Act to accidents which occur outside the boundaries
of the State of-Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1917, the State of Utah adopted a
Workmen's Compensation Act which provides
special protection for employees injured
on the job and that the act be the exclusive remedy of an employee against his
I Title
35,BYU.
UCA).
Digitized employer.
by the Howard W. Hunter(Chapter
Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law School,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Effective January 1, 1974, the State of
Utah adopted a No Fault Insurance Act
which provides that every resident owner
of a motor vehicle in the State of Utah
must maintain minimum insurance protection to occupants of insured motor
vehicles or pedestrians struck by such
vehicles regardless of fault and coordinates the insurance benefits under
the No Fault Act and the Workmen's
Compensation Act*

(Chapter 41, Title 31,

UCA) .
On October 1, 1973, the Insurance
Commissioner adopted Regulation 73-1
which provides for the identification
of "Employer's Fleets:r such as those
owned by Plaintiffs herein for coverage
under the No Fault Act and otherwise
construes the act to be applicable to
Plaintiffs herein. (Exhibit D-l).
Prior to adoption of the regulation and
due
notice,
aReuben
hearing
was BYU.
held
Digitizedafter
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J.
Clark Law School,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

regarding the regulation.

The Insurance

Commissioner found the coordination of
benefits provision between the No
Fault and the Workmen's Compensation Act
reduced the charge of the No Fault premium 10% under the applicable industrial
manual.

(T.27,28).

Plaintiff makes

no claim that he appeared at the public
hearing or made any objection thereto.
In February of 1974, the Insurance
Commissioner adopted and issued his
No Fault Bulletin requiring an extension
of No Fault coverage so as to include
out-of-state accidents by motor
vehicles otherwise required to carry
No Fault Insurance under the act.

There

were two reasons for the adoption of
the February bulletin.

Prior to the

No Fault Act, many policy holders in
the State of Utah had purchased medical
coverage which covered their accidents
whether within the State of Utah or

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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without the State.

The adoption of

No Fault with its required medical
coverage meant such medical duplication
policies were no longer necessary.
The major independent companies in the
State extended the No Fault coverage
to include out-of-state accidents
without additional premium.

The rest

of the companies extended the coverage
to include out-of-state accidents on a
family policy for a premium of $2.00
per year. (T.24,2 5,2 6,27).
Plaintiff makes no claim that he
objected to the adoption or promulgation
of the bulletin.
The Plaintiffs in this case are
interstate carriers who are resident
owners of motor vehicles in this state
and employ drivers who have had accidents
in Utah and surrounding states for
which benefits have been claimed by
their employees against the Plaintiffs
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

under the Utah No Fault Act (T.5,6).
Plaintiffs make no claim that they
requested a hearing on their complaint
against and differences with the Insurance Commissioner nor do they claim
such hearing has been held before the
Commissioner and that the Commissioner
has made findings in this regard.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING
THE PLAINTIFFS TO EXHAUST THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE SEEKING RELIEF
FROM THE COURT/
This issue presents an important
question of law for decision.

In a

case where a Plaintiff is aggrieved by
a ruling or regulation adopted by a
State Administrative Agency, and there
exists by statute a procedure whereby
persons aggrieved by such ruling may
have a hearing before the agency for
the purpose of correction of any mistakes
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or errors caused by the ruling of the
agency, and to allow the agency to
review the application of the ruling
or regulation for the purpose of
correcting the errors or remedying
any injustice caused by such action
of the agency, must the person aggrieved
avail himself of the administrative
relief available to him prior to
seeking relief from the courts?
Plaintiffs filed this action
against the Utah Commissioner of
Insurance alleging that the Commissioner
adopted regulations under the No Fault
Act set out above and otherwise construed
the Act so as to require Plaintiffs
trucking lines, operating fleets of
vehicles within the State of Utah,
to insure under the Utah No Fault Act
and that the Commissioner promulgated
the ruling set out above requiring Utah
DigitizedMotor
by the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clarkout-of-state
Law School, BYU.
Carriers
to obtain
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

endorsements on their No Fault insurance which ruling the Plaintiffs claim
should be struck down by the court.
It is these acts of the State Insurance
Commissioner by which Plaintiffs claim
they are aggrieved .

The Utah Insurance

Code provides:
"31-4-1. The Commissioner may hold
a hearing for any purpose he
deems proper under this code. He
shall hold a hearing:
1. If required by any provision
of this code, or,
2. Upon written demand for a hearing made by any person aggrieved
by any act or threatened act or
failure of the Commissioner to act,
if such failure is deemed an act
under any provision of this code,
or by any report, promulgation or
order of the Commissioner.
This administrative remedy is mandatory
upon the Commissioner in all cases where
persons are aggrieved by acts of the
Commissioner and make demand therefor.
If the proper administrative remedy
is followed, the court will benefit
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

from the expertise of the Commissioner
on this very dispute, a record will
have been made for appeal to the District
Court in accordance with the statute,
and the Commissioner will be allowed the
opportunity to correct any mistake he
may have made prior to requiring the
courts to adjudicate the matter.

If

the Plaintiffs after the hearing still
feel aggrieved, our Insurance Code is
explicit in providing the manner in
which an appeal should be taken from the
order of the Commissioner and the action
of the District Court upon hearing the
appeal:
"31-3-10. Manner of Taking Appeal The appeal shall be taken by filing
with the clerk of the District
Court for Salt Lake County a petition for a review of the order or
decision of the Commissioner
containing a copy of the order or
decision, and a statement of the
particulars in which it is claimed
that the order is in error and a
statement of the relief prayed for,
and by serving a copy of the petition
certified by the clerk of court,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
upon
the OCR,
Commissioner."
Machine-generated
may contain errors.

"31-4-12 Hearing and determination
of appeal - Judgment on appeal costs. - The court shall give
precedence to and shall promptly
hear and determine the appeal.
The court shall hear the appeal
upon the transcript of the record
of the commission's hearing and
on such additional proper evidence
as may be offered by any party.
After considering the evidence
the court may affirm, modify, or
set aside the order appealed from.
Costs shall be awarded as in civil
cases."
"The doctrine of exhaustion of
administration remedies requires
that where a remedy before an
administrative agency is provided,
relief must be sought by exhausting
this remedy before the courts will
act. This doctrine is well established, is a cardinal principle of
practically universal application
and must be borne in mind by the
courts in construing a statute
providing for review of administrative action." 2 AmJur 2nd
Administrative Law §595 and cases
cited .therein.
The rule is universally applied
and has been accepted by this honorable
court.

See Walker Bank & Trust Company,

15 U.2d 234,.390 P.2d 592 (1964);
Pacific Intermountain Express v State
Tax Commission, 7 U.2d 15, 316 P.2d

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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549 (1957) .
In the Pacific Intermountain
Express case, supra, this Court stated:
"...Before one may seek a review
of the action of an administrative
body, he must exhaust his administrative remedies and thereby give
the agency an opportunity to
correct any error it may have
made." 8 U.2d at 19.
The same general rule is outlined
in the Walker Bank case supra, wherein
this Court states that as a general rule
exhaustion of administrative remedies
must be had before a case can be brought
before the Courts.

While in the Walker

Bank case, supra, the Court did not
require exhaustion in the classic sense,
it did state with approval the general
rule as stated in the P.I. E, case,
supra, and then held that it was not
requiring administrative exhaustion in
the present case because the acts
complained of were clearly outside the
statutory authority of the administrator.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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This exception is in complete harmony
with the general law requiring exhaustion of remedies.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING
THAT THE LATER ADOPTED PROVISIONS OF
THE UTAH NO FAULT ACT TAKE PRECEDENCE
OVER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
TO THE EXTENT OF THE CONFLICT.
The applicable section of the
Workmen's Compensation Act provides as
follows:
"35-1-60. The right to recover
compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for injuries
sustained by an employee, whether
resulting in death or not, shall
be the exclusive remedy against
any officer, agent or employee of
the employer and the liabilities
of the employer imposed by this
act shall be in place of any and
all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise,
to such employee or to his spouse,
widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal
representatives, guardian, or any
other person whomsoever, on account
of any accident or injury or
death, in any way contracted,
sustained, aggravated or incurred
by such employee in the course of
or because of or arising out of
his
employment,
and
action
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben
Clarkno
Law School,
BYU. at
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

law may be maintained against an
employer or against any officer,
agent or employee of the employer
based upon any accident, injury
or death of an employee..."
The pertinent provisions of the later
adopted No Fault Act read as follows:
"31-41-7(1) Every resident owner
of a motor vehicle shall maintain
the security provided for in
Section 31-41-5 in effect continuously throughout the registration
period of the motor vehicle.!i
31-41-7 Personal Injuries coveredPrimary coverage - reduction of
benefits. - (1) The coverages
described in section 31-41-6
shall be applicable to:
(a) Personal injuries sustained
by the insured when injured in
an accident in this state involving any motor vehicle.
(b) Personal injuries arising
out of automobile accidents
occurring in this state sustained
by any other natural person while
occupying the described motor
vehicle with the consent of the
insured or while a pedestrian if
injured in an accident involving
the described motor vehicle.
(2) When.a person injured is also
an insured party under any other
policy, including those complying
with this act, primary coverage
shall
be
by Law
the
policy
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law afforded
Library, J. Reuben Clark
School,
BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

insuring the motor vehicle out
of the use of which the accident
arose.
(3) The benefits payable to any
injured person under Section
31-41-6 shall be reduced by:
(a) Any benefits which that person
receives or is entitled to receive
as a result of an accident covered
in this act under any Workmen's
Compensation plan or any similar
statutory plan; and
•(b) Any amounts which that person
receives or is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of
its agencies because of military
enlistment, duty or service. "
"In interpretation of statutes, the
legislative will is the all
important or controlling factor...
Accordingly, the primary rule of
construction of statutes is to
ascertain and declare the intention
of the legislature...All rules
for the interpretation of statutes...
have for their sole object the
discovery of the legislative
intent..." 73 AmJur 2nd Statutes
§146.
• It is submitted the following
factors tend to disclose the legislative
intent in enacting the No Fault Act.
A^

No Fault by JLts terms is inclusi1

The operative section above cited
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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provides that every resident owner of
a motor vehicle shall maintain the
required security.

The statute does

not exclude those, who are also required
to provide the coverages under the
Workmen's Compensation Act as is the
claim of the Plaintiff in this case.
The general rule of statutory construction is that where a statute is clear
and unambiguous on its face, it need
not and cannot be interpreted by a
court.

2A Sands, Statutes and Statutory

Construction,, §45.02 (4th Ed. 1973),
See Jay v Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956);
Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949).
in the case of Cammenetti v U.S., 2 42
U.S. 470, (1916), the Supreme Court of
the United States discussed the question
of statutory interpretation and construction.

It stated:

"Where the language is plain and
admits of no more than one
meaning, the duty of interpretation
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

does not arise and the rules which
are to aid doubtful meanings need
no discussion.1' Id at 485.
The court went on to state:
"It is elementary that the meaning
of a statute must in the first
instance be thought in the language
within which the act is framed,
and if this is plain...the sole
function of the courts is to
enforce it according to its terms."
Id.
The court further stated:
"Statutory words are uniformly
presumed, unless the contrary
appears, to be used in their
ordinary and usual sense and with
the meaning commonly attributed
to them." Id at 4 85-86.
B.

No Fault Coordinates Benefits

with Workmen's Compensation.

Under

Section 7 of the No Fault Act quoted
above, the Legislature expressed its
intention to coordinate the benefits
between the No Fault Act and the
Workmen's Compensation Act.

If an

insured is entitled to receive compensation under Workmenr s Compensation his
Fault
benefits
beLaw
reduced
Digitized No
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J.will
Reuben Clark
School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

accordingly.

Although it does not appear

that the Legislature thought the problem
through to its conclusion, it does
appear that the Legislature considered
the fact that benefits were provided
under both Workmen 1 s Compensation and
No Fault and the Legislature set forth
how those benefits were to be coordinated.
Professor Robert E. Keeton of Harvard
Law School has suggested a proposition
that might be used by the court in making
a determination of statutory construction.

His first proposition is as

follows:
"Apply the mandate of the statute
if it appears that the Legislature
did in fact both consider and
prescribe for the problem at hand."
Keeton, Venturing to do Justice,
at pages 94-95, (Harvard University
Press, 1969), see Sands, supra at
§45.09 page 30.
C.

No Fault was enacted later

than Workmen's Compensation. One of the
rules of statutory construction is that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

if there is an irreconcilable conflict
between the new provision and the
prior statutes relating to the same
subject matter, the new provision will
control as it is the latter expression
of the Legislature.

See e.g. Roberts

v Tise, 198 Ark, 397, 129 S.W. 2d 258,
262 (1939); City of Flat River v
Mackley, 212 S.W. 2d 462,466 (Mo. App.
1948); City of Dallas v Brown, 380
S.W. 2d 833,837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971);
State v Varney, 142 W.Va. 105, 96
S.E.2d 72 (1957); May v Warnick, 227
Myd. 77, 175 A.2d 413 (1961).

In

the City of Flat River case there
existed on the statutes of Missouri,
what was called the "Sunday" law
which prohibited the sale of intoxicating beverages on Sunday.

A later

legislature adopted an act relating
to the sale of what was by statute
defined
beer
Digitized by
the Howard W. as
Hunternon-intoxicating
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
BYU.v/hich
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

provided that said substance could be
sold on Sunday.

In a challenge to the

right to sell beer on Sunday, the
Missouri Courts stated:
"Section 4742, the "Sunday11 law,
and Section 4950, the "Nonintoxicating Beer" law, both being
State laws and Section 4950
being the latter law by the Legislature upon the subject of the sale
of fermented liquor (beer) the
conclusion is inescapable that the
Legislature intended to modify the
"Sunday" lav;.
...This conclusion is in accord
with the decision of our Supreme
Court wherein it has been held
that although two statutes relating
to the same general subject matter
should be read together and harmonized if possible, with a view
to giving effect to a consistent
legislative policy, nevertheless
to the extent that statutes are
inconsistent, the latter statute
which deals with the same in a
particular way will prevail over
an earlier statute of a more
general nature and the latter
statute will be regarded as an
exception to or qualification of
the earlier general statute."
212 S.W. 2d at 466.
In

S^ate v Varney, supra., the West

Virginia Supreme Court states:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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If the several statutory provisions
cannot be harmonized, controlling
effect must be given to the last
enactment of the Legislature
.
and where tv?r> distinct statutes
stand in pari materia and the
sections thereof are in irreconcilable conflict, that section
must prevail which can properly
be considered as the last expression
of the law-making power." 96 S.E.
2d at 72. See Sands, supra, at
§41.02.
D.

Workmen's Compensation is not

an Exclusive Remedy in spite of its
terms.

By its terms the Workmen's

Compensation Statute would seem to make
absolute the fact that Workmen 1 s
Compensation is the only remedy an
employee has against his employer for
injuries sustained by an employee in
the scope of his employment.
course is not the case.

This of

An employee

who falls within the purview of one
of the federal acts such as the
Federal Employer's Liability Act, or
the Federal Longshoreman's and Harbor
Workers
Compensation
Act
isSchool,
allowed
Digitized by
the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law
BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to

proceed under those acts and completely
ignore the absolute terms of the Act.
58 Am Jur Workmen's Compensation §76,
Utah Idaho Central Railway Co, v The
Industrial Commission of Utah, 84 Ut.
364, 35 P.2d 842.
E.

Trial Court f s ruling may be

discriminatory.

The Fourteenth

Amendment to the Federal Constitution
provides a guarantee of equal protection
of the law, requiring that all persons
shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed and that the classification
made by the Legislature must be reasonable
16 AmJur 2d Constitutional Law §485
et seq.

The natural construction of

the No Fault Act as proposed by the
Appellant herein requires every resident
owner of a motor vehicle to be treated
similarly.

Under this construction

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the total benefits to all such insured
parties will be similar when the Workmen'1 s Compensation benefits are coordinated with the No Fault Act as provided.
Under the strained construction
proposed by the Plaintiffs, those who
are allowed the benefits under the
Workmen ! s Compensation Act are forbidden
the benefits provided under Wo Fault
even though these persons fit precisely
in the classification established by
the Legislature for the receipt of No
Fault benefits.

This problem of dis-

crimination is not raised under the
interpretation proposed by Appellant.
Under the interpretation proposed by
Appellant, all of those who fall in the
category fixed by the Legislature for
receiving Workmen's Compensation
benefits will receive the Workmen*s
Compensation benefits provided under
the statute.

Those who additionally

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fall within the category as recipients
of benefits provided by the No Fault
Act,' will additionally receive the
benefits provided under the No Fault
Act.

This constitutional challenge to

the No Fault Act is thereby avoided.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING
THAT THE COMMISSIONER COULD ADOPT
SUPPLEMENTAL REGULATIONS TO THE NO
FAULT ACT WHEN NOT IN CONFLICT WITH
THE TERMS OF THE ACT.
The No Fault Act provides:
•."31-41"-7 Personal Injuries
covered - Primary coverage Reduction of benefits. - (1) The
coverages described in Section
31-41-6 shall be applicable to:
(a) Personal injuries sustained
by the insured when injured in an
accident in this state involving
any motor~vehicTe7
(b) Personal injuries arising out
of automobile accidents occurring
in this state sustained by any
other natural person while occupying the desci'ibed motor vehicle
with the consent of the insured
or while a pedestrian if injured
in an accident involving the
described
motor
vehicle."
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"31-41-5(2) Nothing contained in
this act shall be construed to
prohibit the issuance of policies
of insurance providing coverage
greater than the minimura coverages
required under this act nor to
require the segregation of such
minimum coverages from other
coverages in the same policy.'1
"31-41-12 The department is authorized to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary
for the purposes of this act."
The Insurance Commission promulgated its bulletin in February of 1974
which states:
"To those automobile insurance
companies that have not extended
coverage against injury resulting
from accidents that happen outside
the state of Utah, it will be
required that the out-of-state
extension endorsement of P.I.P.
coverages be included as part of
their No Fault coverage."
The authority granting the Commissioner authority to make rules and
regulations is found in Section
31-2-3.5:
11

(1) The Commissioner may make
reasonable rules and regulations
necessary for, or as an aid to,.
the
effectuation
of Law
any
provisions
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of this code. No such rule or
regulation or regulations shall
conflict with any law of this
State or the reasonable implications thereof."
The question to be determined then
is whether or not the bulletin adopted
by the Commissioner "conflicts" with the
passage of the No Fault Act quoted
above.

It may be helpful to refer to

the meaning of the term "conflict" in
the context in which it is used in the
statute by referring to Webster's
Unabridged Dictionary, (2nd Edition
1953) :
"1. A strife for the mastery;
hostile encounter, a fight;
a battle, especially a prolonged
conflict; struggle.
2. Competition or opposing action
of incompatibles; antagonism as
of divergent interests, ideas,
or acts.
3.. A striking or dashing together;
collision, crash.
4. Psychological presence of
opposing desires or tendencies."
The provision allowing the
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tions which do not "conflict" with
state laws is the same type of provision which allows municipalities to
adopt ordinances v/hich do not "conflict"
with state statutes.

In making the

determination as to whether or not a
city ordinance conflicts with a state
statute, the Ohio Supreme Court in the
case of Village of Struthers v Sokol,
108 Ohio State 263, 140 N.E. 519,521
(1923) held that in determining whether
an ordinance is in "conflict" with
general laws, the test is whether the
ordinance permits or licenses that
which the statute forbids and prohibits
and vice versa.

The exact language

of the court in this respect is as
follows:
"It is manifest that this branch
of the case must turn largely
upon the range of meaning to be
given the word "conflict" and
whether differences, where no
antagonism appears will render
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the ordinances invalid. The
century dictionary has defined
''conflict" as follows:
'Discord of action/ feeling or
effect; antagonism as of interest
or principles; counter-action
as of causes, laws, or agencies
of any kind; opposing action or
tendencies, opposition, collision.*
Measured by the foregoing definition, it is difficult to observe
the real conflict. No real conflict can exist unless the
ordinance declares something to
be right which the state law
declares to be wrong, or vice
versa." 140 N.E. at 521
Two later Ohio cases quote with
approval the definitions of a conflicting
ordinance as given in the Village of
Struthers case, supra.

See Otto v

Whearty, 63 Ohio App. 495, 27 N.E.
2d 190,192 (1940); State v Carran,
133 Ohio State 50, 11 N.E. 2d 245,246
(1937).

It appears also that this

method of determining whether or not a
local ordinance conflicts with a state
statute has been adopted by other courts
as well.

See e.g. Loewenberg v
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Fidelity Union Casualty Company,
147 So. 81-89-90 (La.App. 1933);
People v Fages, 32 Cal. App. 37, 162
Pac. 137,139 (1917).

c.f. Woodruff

v Centanne, 89 So. 2d 570.
It is submitted the test of the
cases then is to determine whether or
not the regulation adopted by the
Commissioner allows or requires something which is prohibited by the No
Fault Act or in the alternative prohibits something which is allowed
under the Act.

There is no provision

in the No Fault Act which prohibits the
Commissioner from adopting the regulation in question and the act itself
allows for additional coverage to be
greater than that provided in the Act.
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CONCLUSION
The Appellants-Defendants respectfully submit that the Trial Court
erred in the points detailed hereinabove and that this court should find
1) that the Plaintiffs failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies before
bringing this action in the court,
2) that the Plaintiffs must comply with
the Utah No Fault Act without regard
to the benefits provided employees
under the Workmen's Compensation Act
and 3) that the Commissioner by regulation can make applicable the No Fault
Act to accidents that occur outside the
boundaries of the State of Utah.
Dated thisoM[ day of March, 1975.
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